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Introduction
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) provides some basic safeguards to ensure
that HFC-23 reductions are additional, primarily aimed at establishing a realistic base-
line scenario for HFC-23 projects. However, there have long been doubts about the
additionality of HFC-23 projects (Wara, 2007a,b). Now Schneider (2011), in an excel-
lent article in Climate Policy, presents compelling empirical evidence that these HFC-23
safeguards have been been unsuccessful. In fact, the evidence shows that the CDM ap-
pears to have created perverse incentives to increase the HFC-23 production. Schneider
provides systematic empirical analysis on a question that so far has been dominated by
suspicion and speculation. It is a paper that deserves to be read.
Proposals aimed to mitigate the ‘additionality problem’ often focus on getting the
baseline right (Geres and Michaelowa, 2002; Begg and der Horst, 2004). Schneider also
argues that “the key deficit of the current methodology is that it implicitly assumes that
plants would continue to operate at or above historically observed HFC-23/HCFC-22
ratio” (Schneider, 2011, p. 855). He proposes that CERs should only be issued for a
proportion of HFC-23 emissions reductions. However, this comment will argue that the
perverse incentives in the CDM are the result of a more fundamental institutional failure.
This comment explains the underlying perverse strategic incentives built into the CDM,
and re-considers the question of to reform the CDM.
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The ‘additionality game’
A simple game will help to clearly illustrate the underlying institutional problem in the
CDM. Consider a project developer that is deciding whether or not to proceed with a
project that will produce E tons of CO2 equivalent emissions. A technology is available
that would reduce these emissions to δE tons, where δ ∈ (0, 1). The cost of installing
and operating this technology is C. The project yields a profit of π. The next best use
of the project developers resources yields a profit of π¯ and E¯ tons of CO2 equivalent
emissions. If the project developer receives any CERs, he can sell these at a price P .
There is a social cost S per ton of emissions, and the project developer incurs a private
cost ￿S, where ￿ ∈ (0, 1).
Let us now consider the cases where the project is the most profitable use of the
developers resources only if it can sell CERs (i.e. π + PE(1 − δ) − C − ￿SE > π¯ −
￿SE¯ > π− ￿SE), and where emissions from this project, with or without the abatement
technology, are higher than from the next best alternative (i.e. E > δE > E¯). Moreover,
although the social cost of the emissions is high enough to justify installing the abatement
technology, the developer will not do so unprompted because he bears only a small
portion of that cost (i.e. SE(1− δ) > C > ￿SE(1− δ)).
This project will increase emissions, and the developer would not find it profitable to
proceed with it unless he was issued CERs to sell. One might think that the Executive
Board (EB) would only ever issue CERs to such a project if it had incorrect information
about the baseline. However, as I will show next, the ‘additionality problem’ remains
even if the EB knows the baseline. Knowing that the emissions reductions from the
technology are not additional, and that emissions in fact increase, would not prevent it
from issuing CERs.
The ‘additionality game’ is a two-stage game. First, the project developer decides
whether or not to start up production of the output and the associated emissions. If he
chooses to ‘Produce’, the EB then decides whether or not to issue CERs for the emissions
reductions that come from installing and operating the abatement technology. Figure 1
illustrates the sequence of events, left to right, and the payoﬀs to the project developer
and the EB are indicated at each terminal node.
Consider first the decision facing the project developer. He gets a payoﬀ π¯ − ￿SE¯
by directing his resources elsewhere. However, if he produces this output and emissions
instead and receives CERs for operating of the abatement technology, he can earn π +
PE(1− δ)−C− ￿SE > π¯− ￿SE¯. If he does not get the CERs, it would not be worth it.
His decision, then, depends on whether he thinks he will receive CERs for the emissions
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{π + PE(1− δ)− C − ￿δSE, δSE}
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Developer
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Figure 1: ‘The additionality game’: The project developer moves at the initial node (left), where he can
play either Produce or Don’t Produce. If he decides to start production, the EB moves, choosing to Issue
or Withhold CERs for this project. The payoﬀs to each player are written at the game’s terminal nodes,
where the Developer’s payoﬀs appear before the comma, and the EB’s payoﬀs after the comma. Solving the
game by backward induction, the EB will get a higher payoﬀ from playing Issue than by playing Withhold,
given that the Developer plays Produce. Anticipating that the EB will play Issue if it plays Produce, the
Developer prefers to play build the plant. Hence the Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium is given by the pair
of strategies {Produce, Issue}, with payoﬀs {π + PE(1 − δ) − C − ￿δSE, δSE}. This game is modeled on
the classic market entry game.
avoided by operating the abatement technology.
The EB knows that this project actually increases emissions, so it would prefer that
the project developer plays Don’t Produce. The EB might even announce that a project
of this sort would not receive CERs, but the EB’s announcement would not be credible.
If the developer plays Produce, emissions will be either E or δE. Because most of the cost
of emissions is not borne by the developer, he does not find the abatement technology
worth the investment, and we would end up with emissions E. On the other hand,
as the representative of the public, the EB bears the full social cost of emissions, and
would thus prefer that the abatement technology is installed. Issuing CERs for the
‘emissions reductions’ E(1− δ) would be suﬃcient to induce the developer to install the
abatement technology, and so the EB will prefer to issue CERs given that the developer
plays Produce. The project developer anticipates that the EB will issue CERs for the
abatement technology, and thus plays Produce while the EB rationally acquiesces and
plays Issue. We thus end up with CERs issued to a project that actually increases
emissions. Moreover, had the CDM not existed, the developer would not expect to
receive CERs, and these emissions would not be produced in the first place. Production
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and emissions would have been lower without the CDM. This accords with Schneider’s
observation that “the amount of HCFC-22 produced in these cases is determined by the
CDM rules and not by other factors, such as market demand.”
Repetition of the ‘additionality game’ is unlikely to resolve the problem.1 If the
developer plays Always Produce it is the EB’s best response to play Always Issue. In
this case, the project developer receives the highest possible payoﬀ in every period. Only
if the project developer adopted some other strategy, such that it becomes more likely to
play Don’t Produce in a particular period if the EB has played Withhold previously, the
EB can discourage some bad projects by withholding CERs a few times even though this
is costly to itself. A lower discount rate and a larger instantaneous gain from preventing
these bad projects would allow the EB to recoup these losses more quickly. These
factors eﬀectively enhance the value of having a reputation for being tough, and would
hence make the threat to play Withhold more credible. However, as already noted, the
developer achieves the highest payoﬀ in every period by adopting the strategy Always
Produce, so he would have no interest in adopting a diﬀerent strategy that might land him
in an equilibrium with lower payoﬀs. Thus, even in the infinitely repeated ‘additionality
game’ we are stuck in a {Produce, Issue} equilibrium. This result is independent of how
much the EB and the developer discount future payoﬀs. Repetition would not resolve
the problem.
Conclusion
The CDM would encourage these bad projects when the developer bears only a small
proportion of the cost of emissions (￿ is small), when the abatement technology is rel-
atively cheap (SE(1 − δ) > C > ￿SE(1 − δ)) and eﬀective (δ is small but still satisfies
δE > E¯). The first condition applies to virtually all greenhouse gas emissions, but the
latter two have been especially true of HFC-23 projects. This is what allows the project
developer to reap “very high CER revenues” relative to the “low GHG abatement costs”
(Schneider, 2011, p. 861). Clearly, many projects will not fit with the assumptions made
above. However, for those projects that do, the CDM actually increases emissions. These
are exactly the sort of perverse incentives that Schneider (2011) describes.
Schneider correctly identifies the problem, but the proposal to issue CERs for only
a proportion of HFC-23 emissions reductions does not get to the root of it. As the
‘additionality game’ illustrates, the perverse incentives related to HFC-23 projects are
1Note that the role of ‘project developer’ will probably be played by a diﬀerent developer in each
iteration of the repeated game.
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a consequence of strategic interaction between project developers and the EB. Hence,
there are institutional reasons why the CDM is unlikely to be able to credibly commit to
reducing the amount of CERs issued for HFC-23 projects. Moreover, the ‘additionality
game’ shows that there are more general conditions that underlie the perverse incentives.
Going after HFC-23 projects specifically, therefore, does not eliminate the possibility
that other projects will emerge with these perverse incentives. For instance, doubts
have already been raised about the additionality of Chinese hydropower projects (Haya,
2007). A solution that targets only HFC-23 projects will fail to address the wider problem
of perverse strategic incentives created by the CDM.
Schneider (2011) provides an excellent empirical analysis of the perverse incentives
in the CDM, but the underlying problem is one of poor institutional design. The rules
of the game award ultimate power to project developers instead of the EB. The EB can
threaten to withhold CERs, but the developer knows this threat is void. The crucial
issue when reforming the CDM is to make sure that the EB can credibly commit to
withholding carbon credits. Failing this, it may be preferable to remove this conflict
from the CDM altogether by pursuing another of Schneider’s proposals: fund these
kinds of emissions reductions directly through a multilateral fund.
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